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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On 3-18-80, resporrlent filed a suit against appellant for the 
recovery of earned but unµi.id insurance premiums . Defendants v.ere there-
after properly served with process. Prior to the initiation of the action, 
resp:mdent, through its attorney, wrote to appillant Mmmtain West Trans-
r:ortation Canµi.ny derranding the amount due and gave appellants until 3-7-80 
to !EY or make arrangsnents to µi.y the unpaid insurance premiums. (R. 39) 
No response vas received fran appellants. (R. 37) After the filing of 
the action, an agent of appellant, I:avid Stannard, met with Steven Wisaran 
of respondent. (R. 32) According to Wisenan, the t\\O µirties did agree 
as to an amount due unless several checks issued by appellant to respoodent 
in fact cleared appellant's tank, which they did not. (R. 32, 33, 35 and 
36) Pursuant to instructions fran Wisenan, respondent's attorney wrote 
another letter to Stannard on or alx>ut 3-21-80. (R. 40-42) said letter 
specifically stated that respcndent vas going to m01Te forward expeditiously 
with its legal action against appellants i.mless certain minor details were 
'.>Drked out with respondent's attorney. (R. 42) Respondent's attorney was 
never contacted. (R. 37) Therefore, a default judgment was entered 5-7-80. 
In respcnse to appellants' Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment an 
untranscril:Ed hearing was held 8-28-80 refore the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. 
Appellants' motion v.es argued to and denied by Judge Rigtrup by order dated 
9-8-80. 
-1-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Steven Wissren in his affidavit (R. 32-33) and respondent's attorney 
in his affidavit (R. 37-38) roth denied ever agreeing to or statinq that the 
lawsuit would not be pursued, which fact is substantiated by copies of 
respondent's attorney's letters mentioned al:ove. 
THE LOWER COURT' DID Nor ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUS~ 'ID SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUD3MENT 
A great number of cases have been previously decided by this court 
regarding the setting aside of default judqments. It is not the intent 
of this brief to exhaustively review or research this area of the law, 
inasmuch as the =urt is very familiar with tre general law regarding these 
cases. The case law is very clear in showing that the lower court in the 
case at bar did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate respondent's 
judgment. 
A closer look at the cases cited in appellant's brief shows that 
tre Utah SUpr6lle Court has only overruled the discretion of trial courts 
in cases of obvious error. For example, in Locke v. Petersen, 3 Utah 2d 415, 
285 P.2d llll, this court overturned the lower court in a case where con-
fusion was created by a defendant's not teing served with an exact copy of 
the original surrmons. In that case, the Utah supreme Court stated, ;{rt is) , 
our declared policy that in case of uncertainty, default jtrlgments shollld 
te set aside to allow trial on the merits." Id. at lll3 of P.2d. There 
was no uncertainty in tre case at bar other than that created by appellants' 
failure to respond to the clear lanquage of the surrmons (R. 5-Bl and of the 
letters sent by respondent's attorney. 
-2- l 
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In 1962, in the case of Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Cgnpany, 14 Utah 
2d 52, 376 P.2d 951, a case also cited in appellant's brief, this court held 
ttat the default judgment srould have been set aside by the 10\\er =urt 
where there was a showing that process was served upon a party who had 
previously sent notices of resignation of his corporate ca:pacity to other 
parties involved with the corporate defendant. J!..s with the previously dis-
cussed case, there was a potential problem with process. This =urt stated 
the general rule that trial courts are endowed with considerable discreticn 
in these matters as long as they do not act arbitrarily. Id. at 952 of P.2d. 
Judge Rigtrup did not act arbitrarily. Appellants merely chose to put their 
resf€ci:ive heads in the sand and to disregard written notices and SU'llllCrlS. 
Also cited in appellants' brief was the case of Central Finance Cgm::any 
v. Kynaston, 22 Utah 2d 284, 452 P.2d 316. Both parties were represented 
by =unsel but defendant's counsel and defendant failed to appear for a 
trial and a default was accordingly entered. The issue was whether or not 
the clerk had properly notified the defendant and his attorney of the trial 
date. There are none of the glaring problems in the case at bar as with 
the previously discussed cases. 
This court in June of 1979 handed dOWl. a decision which sets forth 
clear guidelines for decisions such as this. Heath v. Mo\Er, 597 P. 2d 855' 
was a case in which the defendant moved the 10\\er court to set aside a default 
judgrrent entered against him for fraudulent misrepresentaticn. The actual 
facts of the case differ rrarkedly fran the case at bar, but the =urt in 
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uph:>lding the lower court's refusal to set aside the default judgment in 
its dicta set clear criteria for deciding this matter. The court stated, 
Whether a trial court should set aside a default judorrent 
is largely a discretionary matter, and we will reverse a 
court's ruling cnly if it is clear the court abused that 
discretion ... Id. at 858 of P. 2d. 
The court also quoted one of its previous decisions (Airken Intennountain, 
Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P. 2d 431) in putting the l::llrden on the 
mJVing party to set aside a default. The moving party "must show that he 
has used du= diligence and that he \>las prevented fran appearing by circum-
stances over which he had no control." Id. at 859. (Emphasis in the 
original). Appellants in the case at bar did not use "due diligence" and 
were in no \>lay prevented fran appearing. In fact, respondent gave appel-
lants mJre wamings than required by statute. 
W3rren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Ut. 416, 260 P.2d 741, was a case 
in which this court upheld the lower court's refusal to set aside a default 
judgment in a quiet title action. The court held that more was needed than 
a statement by the moving party that defenses were available and that the 
rroving party had lost his day in court. Id. at 744 of P.2d. In that case, 
this court felt that the loi.er court very well could, in its discretion, 
have set aside the default, but in refusing to reverse the lower court's 
refusal to set aside the default the court held as follows: 
Appellants' conduct is not entirely inexcusable and . 
the trial court could have, in its discretion, set aside 
the judgment; but, on the other hand, respondent and the 
trial court -....ere justified in believing that appellants 
had abandoned their defense. The rule that the courts 
will incline towards granting relief to a party who has not 
had opportunity to present his case is ordinarily applied 
at the trial court level, and this court will not reverse 
-4-
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the trial =urt where it aPfe&s ... that all elerrents ¥.ere 
considered, rrerely because the motion could have teen 
granted. This court will not sub>titute its discretion 
for that of the trial court in a case such as this. Id, 
at 744 of P.2d. ~ 
Ap:i;:ellants are asking this court to exercise equitable pcll'.ers avail-
able mly to the 10\\er court. As in the Warren, supra, decision, there 
has been no abuse of discretion and this court's equitable juQ;irrent should 
not be substituted for that of Jucge Rigtrup. 
CCNCLUSION 
Plaintiff-resp:mdent respectively concludes that the foregoing cases 
clearly srow that defendant-ap:i;:ellant failed ooth l::efore the lower cc:A.Jrt 
and particularly before this court to carry its burden of setting aside 
the default judgment. That is p:irticularly true where no transcript of the 
trial court proceedings was rrade. . Respondent warned appellant throu;rh tw 
different letters of its intention of llOVing forward. Appellant chose to 
ignore these warnings. In fact, it was not until a writ of Executicn was 
served up:m Mr. Charles A. Boyntcn, president of ooth defendants, that 
any action at all took place by appellants. (R. 14). This fact further 
sup:pJrts respcndent' s cla.il!ls, because appellants did nothing fran the 
rreeting in March until 5-15-80, despite appellant's cla:im that ongoing 
negotiations ....ere taking place. 
There was no arose of discretion by the lower court. It is sul::rnitted 
that this court should not substitute its judgnent for that of Judge Rigtrup, 
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even if the judges of this court might have cane to a different conclusiCTl 
had they been sitting in Judge Rigtrup' s chair on August 28, 1980. 
Therefore, the lov.er court's ruling should re upheld and the judgnent 
should not be set aside. 
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